The recent confrontation between India and Pakistan highlights the significant influence of Pakistan's military and ISI in worsening the instability in Kashmir.
On Tuesday, Indian aircraft conducted strikes on multiple targets in Pakistan's Punjab Province and the Pakistani-administered region of Kashmir. In retaliation, Pakistan shelled areas in Indian-administered Kashmir. New Delhi has named its operation "Operation Sindoor." Pakistan reported that 26 civilians lost their lives in the strikes, while India stated that at least seven people were killed due to the Pakistani shelling.
As Indian and Pakistani forces are currently exchanging fire, it's important to examine the events that prompted India's actions this week. The escalating tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad, which have culminated in open conflict, stem from a violent terrorist attack that occurred on April 22 in the Baisaran valley near Pahalgam, located in India's Jammu and Kashmir region.
As Indian and Pakistani forces are currently exchanging fire, it's important to examine the events that prompted India's actions this week. The escalating tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad, which have culminated in open conflict, stem from a violent terrorist attack that occurred on April 22 in the Baisaran valley near Pahalgam, located in India's Jammu and Kashmir region.
The specifics and context of the attack sparked significant outrage in India and a strong resolve to retaliate against Pakistan, due to its longstanding support for Islamist insurgent groups in the Indian-administered region of Kashmir. The Pahalgam attack marked the most severe terrorist incident in Kashmir since 2019 and was the deadliest assault on civilians in twenty years. The incident, which resulted in the deaths of 26 Indian citizens and one Nepali, has particularly fueled public anger in India.
Pakistani terrorists targeted Hindu tourists in a brutal attack. Eyewitnesses reported that the assailants sought to determine the religion of their captives before executing them. The travelers were asked to recite the Kalima prayers—verses from Islamic Hadiths taught in South Asian madrassas—and some were even subjected to physical examinations. Once the attackers confirmed their victims were Hindus, they executed them in front of their families, including newlyweds among the deceased. Pakistani authorities have denied any involvement in the incident. However, the long-standing history of state support for Islamist proxy militias in Kashmir, coupled with an initial claim of responsibility (later retracted) by a group known to have ties to militants backed by Islamabad, led Indian officials to view these denials as unconvincing. Pakistan has a longstanding policy of using proxy Islamist groups as a means to exert influence against India and beyond.
The involvement of these groups in this context significantly differs from the typical Middle Eastern scenario. Countries like Iran and Turkey utilize Islamist proxies as part of a cohesive state strategy. In contrast, in Pakistan, support for Islamist groups operating in Kashmir and other regions is primarily managed by specific state agencies. These agencies may mobilize proxy groups as part of their internal power struggles within the country. Concerning the Pahalgam attack, a group known as the Resistance Front (TRF) initially claimed responsibility, only to later deny it. This organization, which surfaced in 2019, is viewed by Indian authorities as a proxy for the more prominent Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a Salafi jihadi group that has been engaged in conflict against India in Kashmir since 1986. Notably, LeT was responsible for training the terrorists involved in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which resulted in the deaths of 175 individuals, including nine attackers.
The Resistance Front (TRF), which deliberately avoids using Islamic language and symbols, seems to have been created to give a secular and local appearance to the activities of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Both TRF and LeT are recognized as terrorist organizations by the Indian government. However, the overtly sectarian nature of the attacks in Pahalgam contradicts TRF's attempt to present itself as a secular militant group. There is significant evidence linking the formation of TRF to the actions of LeT militants. It appears that TRF was established by members of LeT and a related group, Hizbul Mujahideen, with support from Pakistan, as part of a strategy to escalate militancy following India's revocation of Jammu and Kashmir's "special status" in 2019.
Alongside its aim to present a more secular image, Pakistan was clearly focused on steering clear of scrutiny from the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force (FATF). This agency, backed by the G7, had placed Pakistan on its "gray list" of jurisdictions subject to heightened monitoring due to evidence of the country's support and financing of terrorist organizations. The Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a group designated as a terrorist organization by the UN, was particularly under investigation, prompting the need for the emergence of seemingly new organizations. Nevertheless, in 2022, the FATF removed Pakistan from its list.
There is substantial evidence connecting Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) to various agencies within the Pakistani state. Notably, Pakistan's influential Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency has a longstanding history of supporting and directing LeT's activities. This connection has been corroborated by testimonies from jihadis held at Guantanamo Bay, which were later released by Wikileaks, as well as statements from former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. In a 2021 interview, Musharraf remarked, “In the 1990s, the freedom struggle began in Kashmir. During that time, Lashkar-e-Taiba and around 11 or 12 other organizations were established. We supported and trained them as they fought in Kashmir, risking their lives.” To understand why the Pakistani military and ISI may be seeking to escalate tensions in Kashmir now, several Indian researchers have highlighted the current internal instability, the increasing unpopularity of the army, and the hardline approach of General Asim Munir, the current commander of the Pakistani army.
The arrest of former Prime Minister Imran Khan, the targeting of his supporters, rising discontent among Pakistan's Baluch and Pashtun minorities, and a stagnant economy are all contributing to instability in the country. In an article published on April 25 for the London-based Chatham House, Dr. Chietigi Bajpaee pointed out that there have been instances of attacks on India during times when the Pakistani military feels sidelined. Additionally, in a speech delivered in Islamabad on April 16, Munir referred to Kashmir as Pakistan's "jugular vein," asserting that Islamabad would "not forget it" and would continue to support their Kashmiri brothers in their courageous struggle.
When considering the connections between the TRF and Lashkar-e-Taiba, as well as Lashkar's ties to the ISI and the Pakistani Army, alongside Pakistan's internal struggles and the army's declining popularity, it becomes plausible—if not likely—that the violence in Pahalgam was orchestrated by factions within the Pakistani security apparatus. India's military has now responded. While there have been exchanges of fire, a full-scale war between the two nuclear-armed nations seems unlikely. Instead, a series of controlled exchanges is more probable. The international community will likely attempt to mediate a de-escalation. However, this approach will not resolve the underlying issue: Pakistan's disregard for internationally accepted norms through its support and activation of proxy Islamist military groups as a means of pursuing its policy objectives.
Recent developments in the Middle East highlight the dire consequences of permitting such practices to persist without oversight. The situations in both regions are similar: political Islam is being exploited to further state interests, or, in the case of Pakistan, the interests of specific state agencies. The outcome in both contexts is equally detrimental to the lives of those in the affected areas.
Pakistani terrorists targeted Hindu tourists in a brutal attack. Eyewitnesses reported that the assailants sought to determine the religion of their captives before executing them. The travelers were asked to recite the Kalima prayers—verses from Islamic Hadiths taught in South Asian madrassas—and some were even subjected to physical examinations. Once the attackers confirmed their victims were Hindus, they executed them in front of their families, including newlyweds among the deceased. Pakistani authorities have denied any involvement in the incident. However, the long-standing history of state support for Islamist proxy militias in Kashmir, coupled with an initial claim of responsibility (later retracted) by a group known to have ties to militants backed by Islamabad, led Indian officials to view these denials as unconvincing. Pakistan has a longstanding policy of using proxy Islamist groups as a means to exert influence against India and beyond.
The involvement of these groups in this context significantly differs from the typical Middle Eastern scenario. Countries like Iran and Turkey utilize Islamist proxies as part of a cohesive state strategy. In contrast, in Pakistan, support for Islamist groups operating in Kashmir and other regions is primarily managed by specific state agencies. These agencies may mobilize proxy groups as part of their internal power struggles within the country. Concerning the Pahalgam attack, a group known as the Resistance Front (TRF) initially claimed responsibility, only to later deny it. This organization, which surfaced in 2019, is viewed by Indian authorities as a proxy for the more prominent Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a Salafi jihadi group that has been engaged in conflict against India in Kashmir since 1986. Notably, LeT was responsible for training the terrorists involved in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which resulted in the deaths of 175 individuals, including nine attackers.
The Resistance Front (TRF), which deliberately avoids using Islamic language and symbols, seems to have been created to give a secular and local appearance to the activities of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Both TRF and LeT are recognized as terrorist organizations by the Indian government. However, the overtly sectarian nature of the attacks in Pahalgam contradicts TRF's attempt to present itself as a secular militant group. There is significant evidence linking the formation of TRF to the actions of LeT militants. It appears that TRF was established by members of LeT and a related group, Hizbul Mujahideen, with support from Pakistan, as part of a strategy to escalate militancy following India's revocation of Jammu and Kashmir's "special status" in 2019.
Alongside its aim to present a more secular image, Pakistan was clearly focused on steering clear of scrutiny from the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force (FATF). This agency, backed by the G7, had placed Pakistan on its "gray list" of jurisdictions subject to heightened monitoring due to evidence of the country's support and financing of terrorist organizations. The Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a group designated as a terrorist organization by the UN, was particularly under investigation, prompting the need for the emergence of seemingly new organizations. Nevertheless, in 2022, the FATF removed Pakistan from its list.
There is substantial evidence connecting Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) to various agencies within the Pakistani state. Notably, Pakistan's influential Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency has a longstanding history of supporting and directing LeT's activities. This connection has been corroborated by testimonies from jihadis held at Guantanamo Bay, which were later released by Wikileaks, as well as statements from former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. In a 2021 interview, Musharraf remarked, “In the 1990s, the freedom struggle began in Kashmir. During that time, Lashkar-e-Taiba and around 11 or 12 other organizations were established. We supported and trained them as they fought in Kashmir, risking their lives.” To understand why the Pakistani military and ISI may be seeking to escalate tensions in Kashmir now, several Indian researchers have highlighted the current internal instability, the increasing unpopularity of the army, and the hardline approach of General Asim Munir, the current commander of the Pakistani army.
The arrest of former Prime Minister Imran Khan, the targeting of his supporters, rising discontent among Pakistan's Baluch and Pashtun minorities, and a stagnant economy are all contributing to instability in the country. In an article published on April 25 for the London-based Chatham House, Dr. Chietigi Bajpaee pointed out that there have been instances of attacks on India during times when the Pakistani military feels sidelined. Additionally, in a speech delivered in Islamabad on April 16, Munir referred to Kashmir as Pakistan's "jugular vein," asserting that Islamabad would "not forget it" and would continue to support their Kashmiri brothers in their courageous struggle.
When considering the connections between the TRF and Lashkar-e-Taiba, as well as Lashkar's ties to the ISI and the Pakistani Army, alongside Pakistan's internal struggles and the army's declining popularity, it becomes plausible—if not likely—that the violence in Pahalgam was orchestrated by factions within the Pakistani security apparatus. India's military has now responded. While there have been exchanges of fire, a full-scale war between the two nuclear-armed nations seems unlikely. Instead, a series of controlled exchanges is more probable. The international community will likely attempt to mediate a de-escalation. However, this approach will not resolve the underlying issue: Pakistan's disregard for internationally accepted norms through its support and activation of proxy Islamist military groups as a means of pursuing its policy objectives.
Recent developments in the Middle East highlight the dire consequences of permitting such practices to persist without oversight. The situations in both regions are similar: political Islam is being exploited to further state interests, or, in the case of Pakistan, the interests of specific state agencies. The outcome in both contexts is equally detrimental to the lives of those in the affected areas.
